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Motivational approaches to intellectual vice 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical 
discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption, that 
just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that 
we arenÕt. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false; motivational approaches to 
intellectual vice cannot explain a range of intuitive vice cases. The popularity of the assumption is 
accounted for by its being a manifestation of a more general understanding of vice as an inversion or 
mirror image of virtue. I call this the inversion thesis, and argue that the failure of the motivational 
approach to vice exposes its limitations. I conclude by suggesting that recognising these limitations can 
help kick start philosophical interest in intellectual vice. 
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What features characterise the intellectually vicious agent? For all the surge of interest in intellectual 
character traits over the past couple of decades, this is a question that epistemologists have rarely engaged 
with. Instead, virtue epistemology has been marked by an overwhelming focus on the positive, on the 
virtues that constitute intellectual excellence. Until very recently the traits at the opposite pole of the 
character spectrum, the vices that constitute deficiencies in intellectual agency, have attracted attention 
only fleetingly1. 
In this paper I wish to contribute to recent efforts to draw attention to and rectify this imbalance2. 
In particular, I want to challenge what is emerging as the orthodox answer to my opening question. Where 
attention has turned to vice, either in passing or more purposefully, it is often claimed that the vicious 
agent exhibits a distinctive psychology: that vice requires a defective motivational state 3 . Thus, Linda 
Zagzebski grounds criticism of intellectual vices in a Òdefect of motivationÓ (1996:209), James 
Montmarquet identifies vice with a Òlack of effortÓ (2000: 138-9), Jason Baehr claims that vices involve a 
Òlack of desire for knowledgeÓ (2010: 209), and Heather Battaly that they require Òdis-valuable 
motivationsÓ (2016b: 106). This assumption, commonly endorsed but rarely explicated or defended, is 
the main target of this paper. In challenging it, however, I also draw attention to the limitations of a 
broader but similarly common assumption regarding the nature of vice and its relationship to virtue. I 
term this assumption the inversion thesis: that in a range of theoretically significant ways, virtue and vice 
are straightforward opposites. I contend that the tendency to assume an unrefined form of the inversion 
                                                      
1 Where discussed, vice is often treated as derivative from or an aid to the development of a theory of virtue; see 
respectively the seminal works by Zagzebski (1996), and Baehr (2011). Swank (2000), Fricker (2007), Baehr (2010), 
and Battaly (2010) are all relatively early exceptions to this rule, whilst Roberts and WoodÕs Intellectual Virtues (2007) 
contains discussion of several vices.  
2 See Battaly (2014, 2016b),  Cassam (2016), Kidd (2016a), and Tanesini (2016). 
3 Two theorists who reject a motivational approach are Swank (2000) and Cassam (2016). SwankÕs analysis is 
premised upon an undeveloped and unconvincing distinction between epistemic traits and Ôpersonal traitsÕ. Cassam, 
meanwhile, approaches the analysis of character vices from a consequentialist perspective, whereas I am interested 
in a responsibilist analysis. This is not the place to explore the merits and demerits of these two frameworks, though 
I touch upon my reservations about employing virtue-theoretic language to describe purely consequentialist 
phenomena in Sections 2 and 3. 
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thesis at least partially accounts for the paucity of substantive, stand-alone discussion of vice, and in 
particular accounts for the popularity of the motivational approach. The hitherto unacknowledged 
implausibility of the latter, I argue, highlights the need to be more careful about how we put the inversion 
thesis to work. 
The purposes of this paper, then, are twofold. My more specific goal is to develop and reject the 
motivational approach to intellectual vice. Accordingly, in Sections 1 and 2 I explicate two forms of 
motivational approach, in which vice requires either the presence of bad motivations or the absence of good 
ones. I demonstrate that neither of these approaches can accommodate the full range of intuitive and 
important vice cases. Then, in Section 3, I examine the asymmetry between virtue and vice that this leaves 
us with, such that the former, but not the latter, is characterised by a distinctive sort of motivational state. 
I show that this asymmetry actually follows quite straightforwardly from the orthodox view of virtues as 
praiseworthy and vices as blameworthy, which raises the question of why this point has not been more 
widely recognised in the virtue epistemological literature. This brings me to my second, more general 
purpose, of using my criticism of the motivational approach to vice to highlight the limitations of the 
inversion thesis. I address this in Section 4, where I argue that, even if virtue and vice are opposites in 
some senses, this does not mean they canÕt also come apart in interesting and important ways. 
I shall start with some quick clarifications and qualifications. First, as is customary in the 
literature, I use the terms ÔintellectualÕ and ÔepistemicÕ broadly interchangeably. Second, and more 
substantively, in talking of intellectual character as I have done I purposefully align myself with 
responsibilist virtue epistemology. I do not discuss virtue reliabilism, the position that epistemic virtues 
are qualities or faculties that reliably produce epistemic goods. However, I do not take this to be a 
limitation that requires defending, since I do not think that responsibilism and reliabilism, in their most 
interesting and plausible forms, are in tension4. Rather, I take them to be fundamentally different projects 
                                                      
4 I also suspect modelling vice on reliabilist terms will be more straightforward. See, for example, Battaly (2014). 
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trying, for the most part, to answer fundamentally different questions5. Similarly, in talking of intellectual 
character I have signalled my intention to focus on virtue epistemology. Given the influence of virtue 
ethics on responsibilist virtue epistemology I shall have recourse to insights from the former, and I suspect 
that similar conclusions to those offered here will be applicable to virtue ethics, but I do not commit 
myself to or require this outcome.  Accordingly, when I speak of ÔvirtueÕ or ÔviceÕ I shall be referring solely 
to (responsibilist) epistemic virtues and vices, unless otherwise stated.  
1: The presence conception 
What does it mean to say that vice involves a defective motivational state? To unpack this, it will be worth 
considering what responsibilists mean when they maintain that virtues involve an excellent motivational 
state. Generally speaking, they hold that there are two elements to virtuous motivation. Clearly, virtues 
involve dispositions to act and think in certain ways: the open-minded person will habitually take seriously 
a range of viewpoints and remain open to alternative explanations, the diligent person will pursue every 
lead and check and recheck their findings, and so on. A given virtue is therefore partially a disposition to 
be motivated by a particular set of these ends. We can refer to these as the proximate ends of that virtue.  
Being motivated by the proximate ends of a particular virtue does not, however, itself make you 
epistemically virtuous. Rather, the virtuous agent is one whose motivation for these proximate ends is 
itself grounded in a more fundamental motivation for epistemic goods, like truth, knowledge, and 
understanding. These are the ultimate ends of epistemic virtue. So, the virtuously open-minded person is 
motivated to take seriously a range of viewpoints, and is so because of their more fundamental motivation 
for epistemic goods6. This motivation towards the appropriate ultimate ends is crucial because of how 
                                                      
5 Whilst reliabilism remains focused on attempts to answer some of the classic questions in epistemology, (see, for 
example, two seminal texts: Greco, 2010; Sosa, 2007), the consensus now seems to be that responsibilism, at least 
alone, is ill-suited to address these issues (see Baehr, 2011; Roberts & Wood, 2007).  
6 Baehr (2012) is the only theorist to analyse this grounding relation in any detail. He claims that the virtuous agent 
must Ôreasonably believeÕ that their proximate ends are Ôsuitably relatedÕ to the ultimate ones, where suitable relations 
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responsibilists conceive of virtues: as aspects of an agentÕs character that are intrinsically excellent, their 
value not (or not entirely) derived from the value of some external good to which they are conducive. 
Being motivated by epistemic goods for their own sake is good in precisely this way, and thus grounds the 
motivational excellence of virtue (Zagzebski 1996: 202-211; Baehr 2011: 91-102). Proximate motivations, 
meanwhile, connect the agentÕs ultimate ends and their actions in the world, but they are not themselves 
constitutive of intellectual excellence. This is not to dismiss them as unimportant. As was noted above, 
each individual virtue involves a characteristic disposition to act and think in certain ways, and it is 
through these proximate motivations that we individuate specific virtues; hence, there is not just a single 
virtue of motivation towards epistemic goods. However, it is the ultimate ends that play the crucial, value-
conferring role. One can have the proximate ends of a particular virtue and not be virtuous, as in the case 
of someone who acts in open-minded ways purely to appear enlightened before their colleagues. One can 
plausibly even be virtuous despite lacking the proximate motivations characteristic of any particular virtue7. 
Intellectual virtue requires, however, and is at least partially constituted by, an agentÕs being motivated by 
the appropriate ultimate ends.  
If an agentÕs orientation towards epistemic goods is what grounds the excellence of intellectual 
virtues, we might naturally think that a contrasting orientation grounds the dis-value of intellectual vice. 
It is this thought that underpins the motivational approach to intellectual vice. This idea of a contrasting 
orientation can be expanded on in two ways, both of which do in fact enjoy some support within the 
literature. The first account of this form takes vice to involve the presence of bad epistemic motivations. So, 
                                                      
might include relations of epistemic reliability, of constituting the (partial) fulfilment of the ultimate ends, and so 
on. I am warier of the intellectualism inherent in this account than Baehr, despite his attempts to offset it, but 
sustained elaboration of this grounding relation need not concern us here. I trust that the picture I have presented, 
whilst simple and stylised, is sufficiently clear to proceed.  
7 Baehr and Montmarquet may accept this, since both make the appropriate motivational state sufficient for virtue. 
Zagzebski thinks it is merely necessary, and the virtuous agent will also be reliably successful in producing epistemic 
goods. Thus, she might maintain that appropriate proximate motivations are necessary too, but only insofar as they 
are necessary to secure this reliability. The value of proximate ends here is still not intrinsic, but derived from the 
good consequences they produce. 
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mirroring how virtue requires that, ultimately, we are motivated by epistemic goods, vice on this account 
requires that we are, ultimately, motivated by epistemic bads (or, perhaps, away from epistemic goods). I 
call this form of motivational approach Ôthe presence conceptionÕ.  
Heather Battaly has explicated a responsibilist conception of vice in several places, and in so 
doing often suggests something like the presence conception. She claims that, like virtues, Òepistemic vices 
will also require motivationsÓ (2016b: 105) and that they are Òpartly composed of bad epistemic motivesÓ 
(2017: 5), thus construing vice as something active that involves being motivated in the (in)appropriate 
way. Furthermore, and again echoing the conventional responsibilist story of virtue, she claims that itÕs 
these motivations that ground the intrinsic dis-value of vice: Òepistemic vices will get some (or all) of their 
dis-value from the dis-valuable motivations they requireÓ (2016b: 106)8. To be viable, of course, this 
picture requires that we construe bad motivations more broadly than simply motivations for ignorance 
or falsehood; if there are Ôepistemic rebelsÕ, as Battaly describes people with such motivations, they are 
likely to be rare (2014: 73). Accordingly, she counts not only the motivations to not believe certain things 
or to remain ignorant as epistemically disvaluable, but also, more subtly, motivations for things like easy 
beliefs, comfortable beliefs, or to believe whatever will help you fit in with your own group (2014: 62-65; 
2016b: 105), all ways of ordering oneÕs epistemic affairs that donÕt attempt to have beliefs track what is 
true or justified.  
At first glance, the picture of vicious motivation advanced by the presence conception is a perfect 
opposite of the responsibilist picture of virtuous motivation: the vicious agent is ultimately motivated by 
epistemic bads, and this grounds a set of proximate motivations characteristic of a particular vice. In fact, 
the story is not quite so straightforward, in a way that is already suggestive of an interesting disanalogy 
                                                      
8 At times Battaly suggests that other blameworthy psychological features, notably an agentÕs faulty conception of 
the epistemic good, might also be sufficient to ground vice (2014, 2016a). However, her examples of people with a 
faulty conception of the good are all people who take some set of epistemic bads to be good, such as people Òcaring 
too much about upholding the party line or upholding the views in which he is already investedÓ (2016a: 210). 
Accordingly, this is really another way of specifying the same motivational approach: these people are motivated by 
epistemic bads, they just donÕt realise it. 
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between virtue and vice. Prominent responsibilists, as weÕve seen, think that the epistemic goods that 
serve as the ultimate ends of our virtuous traits must be sought for their own sake; they canÕt be merely 
instrumentally useful for the fulfilment of some other goal. However, setting aside the occasional 
epistemic rebel, itÕs likely that motivations towards the kinds of epistemic bads that ex hypothesi 
characterise the vicious agent (easy beliefs, comfortable beliefs, and so on) are generally instrumental. The 
ultimate epistemic end of an epistemically vicious motivation, that is, will itself often be grounded in a 
deeper, non-epistemic motivation: someone who is motivated to believe things that sustain their own 
privilege, for example, is concerned with the sustenance of their own privilege, not the false beliefs in and 
of themselves9. That a motivation for epistemic bads is itself instrumentally useful for some other end, 
however, does not prevent it from being intrinsically disvaluable, in that a motivation of this form is 
problematic in and of itself10.  Consequently, we can set this complication aside and continue to focus 
on the presence conceptionÕs picture of the vicious agentÕs epistemic motivations, their ultimate end in 
this sense being the acquisition of some set of epistemic bads.  
The kind of motivations discussed here are familiar and, surely, vicious. However, the presence 
conception does not provide a general account of the psychological structure of intellectual vice, since it 
overlooks cases of vice where people simply fail to be motivated by the epistemic good, or to even take it 
into consideration. Consider, for example, vices of apathy or inertia, such as laziness, incuriosity, 
thoughtlessness, negligence, and forms of cynicism and snobbery. A striking character who embodies 
many of these vices is Ilya Ilyich Oblomov, the eponymous protagonist of Ivan GoncharovÕs classic novel 
(1983). Oblomov is presented as a parody of a lazy young nobleman, who is almost totally incapable of 
making any decisions or undertaking any actions. Consequently, he spends much of the novel confined 
to his bed. His indolence does not stop here, however, but extends to his intellectual life even within the 
confines of his bed, to the extent that at one point Goncharov notes that when ÒOblomov began 
                                                      
9 See Mills (2007) for discussion of such cases. 
10 Compare the ethical case: willing the suffering of innocents, say, is intrinsically bad even if you only wish to use 
that suffering as a means to some end. For more on this, see Hurka (2001).  
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thinkingÉ he could not make up his mind what to think of firstÓ (ibid: 24). One way that Gabriele Taylor, 
who introduces Oblomov as a paradigm case of sloth, makes sense of such a character is that Òas far as he 
can see there is nothing on offer worth making an effort forÓ (Taylor 2006: 20). Oblomov, in other words, 
is simply uninterested in any form of intellectual engagement with reality. 
Oblomov is intellectually vicious in an extreme way. He is, at the very least, a limit case for laziness 
and incuriosity, deeply engrained character traits that are inhibitive of attempts to acquire epistemic goods, 
that reflect badly upon him, and for which he is blameworthy. However, on TaylorÕs reading certainly, 
these traits are motivated not by an active desire to avoid knowledge or to remain ignorant, but by an 
utter indifference to the two. That is, he is not vicious on account of any bad ultimate ends that guide his 
epistemic life; he is vicious because he has no epistemic ends. Of course, we should be wary of moralism 
here: at least in the sparse picture IÕve sketched, OblomovÕs vices are largely self-regarding Ð there are no 
projects that heÕs letting peter out or companions that heÕs disappointing Ð and consequently he is 
probably not deserving of the same level of criticism or reaction as, say, the type of actively ignorant 
privileged agent briefly mentioned above. Nonetheless, I do not take epistemic agency to be something 
one can simply opt out of. Epistemic activities of some sort or another are vital for a good human life, 
and the very least we would want to say is that, in light of these particular traits, Oblomov is unable to 
flourish qua epistemic agent and therefore qua human.  
This is an extreme case, but a multitude of more mundane and localised examples, of the kind 
that populate the responsibilist literature, also fit this model. The scientist who doesnÕt care enough about 
her work to rerun experiments, the negligent detective who overlooks clues because she wasnÕt paying 
attention, and the friend who refuses to try anything new because ÔI know what I like and I like what I 
knowÕ all plausibly count as intellectually vicious not because of what motivates them, but because of what 
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fails to11. The inability of the presence conception to accommodate such cases should be a decisive mark 
against it. 
2: The absence conception 
The inability to accommodate cases like OblomovÕs, along with the more mundanely lazy, apathetic, or 
thoughtless, poses a serious problem for the presence conception of vicious motivation. An appealing 
move might therefore be to argue that the kind of defective motivational state that characterises vice is 
not necessarily the presence of bad motivations but, more broadly, the absence of good motivations. 
Epistemic vice will thus be a matter of failing to take epistemic goods, in certain appropriate cases, as 
oneÕs ultimate ends. This is our second motivational approach to vice: Ôthe absence conceptionÕ. 
The absence conception will be messier than the presence conception. For a start, whilst it is 
plausible to think that motivation by epistemic bads is straightforwardly sufficient for vice, it is surely not 
right that any trait that lacks a motivation for epistemic goods is vicious; the traits that characterise me as 
a tennis player, for example, are not ultimately motivated by epistemic goods, but that presumably doesnÕt 
make them epistemic vices. We thus need a non-ad hoc way to determine which traits are relevant to the 
epistemic domain. A further complication can be grasped by considering Thomas HurkaÕs theory of 
ethical virtue and vice, in which he also initially identifies vice with opposition to the good before 
acknowledging the viciousness of indifference (Hurka 2001). Hurka, however, then takes the dialectic a 
step further and argues that virtue also requires that one is sufficiently motivated by the good, the intuitive 
idea here being that if there is some significant good on the line, there is something amiss with the person 
who is only mildly concerned with it. When applied to virtue epistemology, the upshot is that to avoid 
vice we have to care enough about intellectual goods, a slippery and highly contextual standard.  
                                                      
11 I donÕt claim that all people who do such things are vicious, and are so because they lack the appropriate epistemic 
orientation. However, these examples offer support for my case just so long as it is granted that this is one plausible 
story about their characters. 
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For argumentÕs sake I shall assume that these difficulties are surmountable, and that vice as the 
absence of a (contextually appropriate) concern for epistemic goods is a prima facie viable position to take. 
Indeed, its ability to accommodate both actively bad motivations12 and those of people, like Oblomov, 
who simply donÕt care for the epistemic good means it is an intuitively more plausible position than the 
presence conception. ItÕs therefore unsurprising that this understanding seems to underpin much 
responsibilist thinking on vice, with Zagzebski, James Montmarquet, and Jason Baehr all gesturing at 
something like it13. Montmarquet, for example, identifies intellectual character vices with a Òcharacteristic 
failure to attend to truth or truth-related considerationsÓ; even if thereÕs more to a given vice than just 
this, he claims it is the Òlack of effort that is blameworthyÓ (Montmarquet, 2000: 138-139). Similarly, in his 
paper on epistemic malevolence, Baehr claims that all vices share, and at least partly derive their 
viciousness from, Òeither a straightforward lack of desire for knowledge or an insufficient concern with 
knowledge relative to other goodsÓ (2010: 209). This, he explains, is why epistemic malevolence is the 
epitome of intellectual vice; it takes this lack of desire to the extreme in the form of an outright opposition 
to epistemic goods. Finally, whilst ZagzebskiÕs contention that it is a Òdefect of motivationÓ that serves as 
the Òprimary object of criticismÓ in vice is ambiguous between the presence and absence conceptions, her 
stipulation that people can be criticised for a Òlack of motivation for knowledgeÓ suggests that she is 
probably more sympathetic to this broader motivational approach (1996:207-209). 
Nonetheless, this account also fails to capture all the ways in which an agent can be intellectually 
vicious. That is, there remains an important, and indeed common, type of vicious agent who doesnÕt 
conform to this psychological structure, people who exemplify intellectual vices even though they actually 
are ultimately motivated by epistemic goods. This possibility is attested to by a number of familiar 
                                                      
12 If one is motivated by the bad, one is thereby not motivated by the good. 
13 Like almost all virtue epistemologists, each of these theorists focus primarily on virtue, and none elaborate upon 
vice in any great detail (one exception being BaehrÕs [2010]). This picture has thus been pieced together from various 
suggestive comments each of them have made. Whilst I therefore donÕt take any of them to necessarily be committed 
to the details of this account, I nonetheless think the picture they indicate is highly significant, given their huge 
influence within virtue epistemology and the paucity of fully developed and avowed vice theories. 
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character types. Consider, for example, the shortcomings in GalileoÕs intellectual highlighted by Roberts 
and Wood in their Intellectual Virtue: 
ÒAs brilliant and productive a scientist as Galileo Galilei was, his work was impeded by his 
arroganceÉ His sense of intellectual superiority led him to disregard the work of other 
scientists who disagreed with him, and the incorporation of which could have improved his 
own work. He overestimated the probative force of his arguments for heliocentrism, and thus 
underestimated the justification of those who hesitated to accept his hypothesis.Ó (2007: 254) 
GalileoÕs towering intellectual achievements were undoubtedly made possible only by a 
significant degree of intellectual virtue. However, no oneÕs character is blemish free, and his dealings with 
other scientists paint the picture of an archetypal arrogant genius, keenly aware of his own intellectual 
superiority and thus closed-minded in his dealings with others. As Roberts and Wood note, this imposed 
an epistemic cost even for someone like Galileo.   
Next, consider another recognisable (though on this occasion fictional) character type, drawn 
from the world of politics. LetÕs call him Dave. Dave was born into a wealthy family, who sent him to the 
best schools and finest universities in the world. He was always cognisant of the extent of his privilege, 
though rather than keeping him grounded this awareness merely bestowed upon him a flawed 
understanding of what constitutes an intelligent and reliable person. He thus believed that the only people 
worth listening to were people who, like him, had received a high level of formal education, had studied 
the relevant issues, and could articulate their position through reasoned and dispassionate argumentation. 
When he moved into politics it was therefore with people like this that he surrounded himself. Like 
Galileo, Dave was closed-minded, but he was also prejudiced, partial, and a snob. Consequently, when 
he came to decide whether to implement a policy that would disproportionately harm members of a 
marginalised social group he discounted their concerns about the true extent of the damage, listening 
instead to his team of advisors who downplayed the potential costs. 
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Both Dave and Galileo bear, to varying degrees, the hallmarks of intellectual vice. However, itÕs 
by no means clear that their ultimate ends are the problem. That is, we can expand upon these examples 
with plausible stories in which Galileo was genuinely committed to his intellectual endeavours and Dave 
was a well-intentioned politician who truly wished to ascertain the impact of his policy14; indeed, stories 
in which both engaged in their intellectually vicious acts precisely because they thought doing so would see 
them attain valuable epistemic goods. Roberts and WoodÕs analysis suggests that GalileoÕs arrogance was 
grounded in his sense of intellectual superiority, that it was his belief that he was the most brilliant person 
working on these issues, combined with a desire to get to the truth, that led him to (wrongly) conclude 
he would be better off not listening to lesser intellects. Similarly, Dave surrounded himself with people 
from backgrounds like his own precisely because he wanted an informed, reliable answer, and he had 
grown up to believe that such people will always be the people to provide one15. The motivational 
approach would thus require that we exonerate them for their failings as epistemic agents. If vice requires 
not being appropriately oriented towards epistemic goods, and Dave and Galileo are appropriately 
oriented, then they are not vicious. 
This, I think, is the wrong result, though the reason for this is not simply that they both had 
epistemically unreliable or damaging character traits, since this is not always a reliable guide. Consider, 
by way of helpful comparison, a character introduced by Quassim Cassam (2016): Oliver, a gullible 
conspiracy theorist with a genuine desire for truth but who is led astray on the internet. Cassam argues 
that, despite his good motivations, OliverÕs gullibility still constitutes an intellectual vice, since it is a trait 
that produces bad epistemic effects: it reliably impedes responsible and effective inquiry. IÕm not sure I 
                                                      
14 Again, to undermine the view that vicious agents will necessarily not be motivated by epistemic goods, all that 
matters is that this is one plausible story about their motivational structures. Many actual politicians who fit DaveÕs 
profile, for example, will not deserve this relatively charitable analysis.  
15 One could argue that they acted in this way only because of a prior failure to be sufficiently motivated by the 
epistemic good, which led to them forming these problematic beliefs. Even if this were necessarily the case, and I 
am sceptical that it is, ascriptions of vice are not assessments of oneÕs overall character, but rather of particular 
aspects of it. The question at hand, then, is are Dave and Galileo intellectually vicious at this point, in this respect. 
If vice requires inappropriate motivations, then weÕd be forced to say no.  
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agree with Cassam here. His depiction of OliverÕs character, as is often the case with fictional examples 
of this form, is sparse and probably underdetermined Ð there probably isnÕt a ÔcorrectÕ assessment of 
OliverÕs character Ð but Cassam himself suggests at least the possibility of an alternative reading when he 
claims that Oliver might just be Ògenerally the kind of person who is easily connedÓ (ibid: 163). Reading 
between the lines here, a fairer assessment might be that Oliver is the Ôkind of personÕ who lacks the 
cognitive talents or skills necessary to discern reliable sources of information; in other words, that he 
suffers from a cognitive deficiency more readily associated with a lack of intelligence than with a flaw of 
character. The language of virtue and vice, at least within the responsibilist tradition, is distinctive and 
normatively strong; vice is more than simply a sub-optimal inability, itÕs a fault or flaw. If OliverÕs gullibility, 
whilst reliably damaging in the way Cassam indicates, is simply a fact about his cognitive capacities that 
operates below the level of his beliefs, motivations, attitudes, and desires, if he is trying to ascertain the 
truth but just isnÕt cut out for it, then this language does not seem warranted. 
So IÕm not supposing that acting in epistemically harmful ways, even if they are reminiscent of 
certain intellectual vices, is always indicative of intellectual vice. Dave and Galileo are different from 
Oliver, however. Theirs are not deficiencies in cognitive capacity, but rather complex dispositions 
involving acquired commitments, values, beliefs, sensibilities, and so on. These dispositions are what are 
sometimes referred to as Ôpersonal traitsÕ16, traits that reveal things about the kind of person one is: they 
reveal that Dave only sees a very small portion of society as truly worth listening to, and that Galileo saw 
himself as without epistemic peers. Unlike with ÔmyÕ Oliver, we might also say that, given their faculties 
and opportunities, they should have been able to see why conducting their inquiries as they did was 
problematic, and thus they are potentially blameworthy for doing so. In other words, these are precisely 
the traits that a plausible theory of intellectual vice should look to accommodate. Thus, this second 
version of the motivational approach is also inadequate. 
                                                      
16 See Battaly (2016b; 2017). 
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3: An asymmetry between virtue and vice 
What I hope to have shown over the previous two sections is that the three ways of being oriented towards 
epistemic goods are all consistent with forms of intellectual vice. First, some intellectually vicious agents 
are, as the presence conception highlights, motivated away from epistemic goods, or towards epistemic 
bads, as when people ultimately just want to believe whatever is easiest. Second, as acknowledged by the 
absence conception, some are indifferent to epistemic goods, as in the case of OblomovÕs incuriosity about 
the world. Finally, there are those who, like Dave and Galileo, are genuinely motivated by epistemic goods 
yet nonetheless intuitively warrant the ascription of epistemic vice, a possibility captured by neither form 
of motivational approach. Given this diversity in intellectual vice, any theory that grounds vice in an 
inappropriate orientation towards epistemic goods, as the variants of the motivational approach do, 
cannot be successful. 
At this point, the motivational theorist might attempt a reply. Hitherto the discussion has 
focussed almost exclusively on the ultimate epistemic ends of particular traits, and specifically on an 
agentÕs orientation towards epistemic goods. However, earlier I noted that there are two parts to 
intellectually virtuous motivation Ð proximate and ultimate ends Ð and mutatis mutandis the same is 
presumably true for vicious motivation. Even if no single orientation to a set of ultimate ends can capture 
the diversity of intellectual vice, it also seems undeniable that each of the agents I have discussed have 
proximate motivations that go wrong in some way: they are all motivated by the proximate ends that are 
characteristic of vices like closed-mindedness, arrogance, and so on. Perhaps the conclusion we should 
draw, then, is not that we should reject the motivational approach, but that we should broaden it. Could 
intellectual vice be a matter of defective motivation at the level of either proximate or ultimate ends? 
This move is not open to the motivational theorist, however, or at least not straightforwardly. To 
see why, it will be helpful to remind ourselves why theorists adopt a motivational approach in the first 
place. As was noted in section 1, responsibilists conceive of intellectual virtues as intrinsically excellent 
features of an epistemic agent. They afford a central role to motivation in the form of a positive 
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orientation towards epistemic goods because it is the intrinsic excellence of such an orientation that 
grounds the excellence of virtue. Proximate motivations might connect the agentÕs evaluative orientation 
to the world and allow us to individuate the virtues, but they are very much subsidiary regarding the value 
of virtues; they themselves do not constitute intellectual excellence. Similar thinking, we have seen, 
underpins the motivational approach to vice, if we adopt the responsibilist conception of vices as an 
intrinsically dis-valuable feature of an epistemic agent. The role motivations are assumed to serve is to 
ground the appropriate dis-value in the agent: recall BattalyÕs remarks that vices inherit their dis-value 
from their Ôdis-valuable motivesÕ, and Zagzebski and MontmarquetÕs suggestions that the primary object 
of criticism and blame in vice is a defect of motivation. The vicious agentÕs ultimate orientation towards 
epistemic goods take centre stage in such accounts because it is this orientation that confers the requisite 
intrinsic dis-value. Specific proximate motivations to, say, prefer one groupÕs testimony over anotherÕs or 
to call an inquiry to a halt at a given point, in the absence of an underlying aversion or indifference to 
epistemic goods, just do not fulfil the same role17. Thus, the idea of ÔdefectiveÕ proximate motivations as 
part of a disjunctive motivational approach not only goes beyond what any motivational theorist has in 
fact said on the subject, it would also take them beyond the theoretical constraints of their own theory.  
The upshot of my arguments against the motivational approach, combined with the orthodox 
picture of virtue, is that we are left with an overlooked but fundamental asymmetry between virtue and 
vice. Whilst, for the reasons discussed, it makes sense to think of the virtuous agent as characterised by a 
particular motivational state, the same cannot be said for vice. A particular orientation towards epistemic 
goods is necessary for an agent to be intellectually virtuous. However, whilst certain such orientations 
might be sufficient for vice there is none that is necessary for, unifying amongst, or characteristic of the 
intellectual vices. Virtue, in short, enjoys a psychological unity that vice does not.  
                                                      
17 Similarly, recall my contention that, in spite of his unreliability as an intellectual agent, OliverÕs intellectual 
character is not flawed or problematic in a way appropriate for intellectual vice. This is at least in part, I suggested, 
because his unreliability is not tied in with deeper evaluative commitments and the like.  
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Although hitherto unacknowledged, this asymmetry in fact follows straightforwardly from a 
central plank of the responsibilist conception of virtue and vice. Influenced as they are by the virtue 
ethical tradition, responsibilists generally maintain that virtues and vices are the kinds of things that 
reflect upon us as epistemic agents, and for which we are praiseworthy and blameworthy. Whilst there is 
some debate over whether this attaches to the development of our traits or their exercise, and how exactly 
to accommodate the role of what we might, to paraphrase Thomas Nagel, call Ôconstitutive epistemic luckÕ, 
this remains an important part of the responsibilist project18. Now, certainly within Aristotelian and 
Kantian traditions, it is generally accepted that for an agent to be personally praiseworthy for something 
they must do it purposefully and do it for the right reasons; we do not praise someone if it becomes 
apparent that they donated to charity only for self-serving reasons, or if they did so by mistake. As such, 
itÕs right to take a motivation for the good to be necessary for virtue. However, these standards for praise 
are more ÔdemandingÕ than our standards for blame; we generally donÕt make an analogue of the 
motivation requirement for blame19.  Defective motives might be sufficient for blame, but they are not 
necessary. We would blame someone who purposefully steals from the charity, but we may also blame 
someone who does so unwittingly, picking up a collection box whilst negligently not appreciating what it 
was. 
BlameÕs catchment area is, in fact, quite broad. People can be blamed for things they do 
negligently, for which they are culpably ignorant, that were foreseeable but unintended consequences of 
their actual goal, and so on. Zagzebski herself has suggested that there is a presumption of blame and 
responsibility for character traits that are reliably harmful: if one acts in a way that is epistemically 
damaging then one has a responsibility to acknowledge this and correct it, with subsequent failures to do 
so only increasing the blame due (Zagzebski, 1996: 208). Similarly, the intuitive thought underpinning 
                                                      
18 See Battaly (2016b). 
19 Philip Pettit has recently made a similar point about good and evil (2015). Whilst ascriptions of goodness often 
presuppose that the agent controlled for the good effects of their acts, ascriptions of evil generally require only that 
they allowed bad things to happen. 
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our assessment of Dave and Galileo as vicious was that they Ôshould have known betterÕ; that they didnÕt, 
and that in spite of their capacities and the opportunities available to them they both thought they were 
acting in epistemically appropriate ways, speaks badly of them as epistemic agents in the deep, normative 
way required for a responsibilist ascription of vice. We do not need to locate an inappropriate orientation 
towards epistemic goods to make this judgement; there are other ways to ground the badness of vice. I 
suspect that considerations like this ground blameworthiness for a range of damaging character traits that 
far exceeds, in both type and quantity, those beneficial character traits for which people are praiseworthy. 
4: The inversion thesis 
If this asymmetry, and ultimately the inadequacy of the motivational approach to vice, follows 
straightforwardly from a basic feature of virtue and vice, we might wonder why it is these points have gone 
unnoticed. Why, that is, have a range of virtue responsibilists felt confident to endorse a motivational 
approach without, in many cases, offering a detailed defence of it, and despite its apparent implausibility? 
To answer this question, it will be useful to take a step back and consider a broader one: why has there 
been so little discussion of any aspect of intellectual vice? 
Given the practical and theoretical significance of vice, this oversight should be surprising. 
Paradigm vices, like closed-mindedness, partiality, thoughtlessness, and the intellectual manifestations of 
laziness and snobbery, are a common and damaging feature of our lives, and as the counterpoint to virtue 
vice is a concept of great significance in virtue theory. However, virtue responsibilism has been heavily 
influenced by virtue ethics, and itÕs noteworthy that virtue ethics has itself been characterised by a 
corresponding imbalance for much of its long history. According to Robin Dillon, two popular 
assumptions go a long way towards explaining this continued imbalance in ethics (Dillon 2012) 20. First, 
she claims that philosophers have falsely presumed that vice is something dramatic, rare, and exceptional, 
with the folk concept of ÔviciousnessÕ and all its connotations of brutality and cruelty perhaps a testament 
                                                      
20 For further discussion of this oversight, see McKinnon (1999). 
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to this. The question of how widely this assumption has been held by philosophers is an empirical one21, 
as is the validity of the assumption itself, but the answer to the latter question at least is clear. As far as 
epistemic vices go, I take the idea that these are rare or exceptional to be as patently false as Dillon takes 
it to be for ethical vice. It is not difficult to think of an epistemic analogue of the traits described by Judith 
Shklar as Òordinary vicesÓ, Òthe sort of conduct we all expect, nothing spectacular and unusualÓ (1984: 1). 
The examples mentioned earlier in this paragraph would probably fit the bill.  
More interesting is the second assumption identified by Dillon: that vice is simply the opposite 
of virtue, and so does not merit a stand-alone analysis. Of course, in some sense it is trivially true that 
virtue and vice are opposites; they are the opposing poles of virtue theoretical character evaluations, for a 
start. However, for this fact to (justifiably) inhibit stand-alone discussion of vice one must subscribe to a 
stronger, more substantive assumption. This I term the inversion thesis: that virtue and vice are the mirror 
image of each other, such that they are characterised by the same, if opposing, features. So, for any given 
feature of virtue, vice can be assumed to involve either the evaluative opposite of that feature, or else its 
absence. If a strong version of this thesis were true, then the lack of attention to vice would be justifiable. 
As straightforward mirror images, a theory of vice would fall neatly out of a theory of virtue, and we would 
have two for the price of one. 
I believe that the inversion thesis accounts for the paucity of substantive, stand-alone discussion 
of vice in epistemology in much the same way as Dillon suggests it does in ethics. Consider, for example, 
MontmarquetÕs speculation, in justifying his bookÕs exclusive focus on virtue, that Òit will be clear how 
the vices can be understood as appropriately contrary qualitiesÓ ( 1993: 19), or BattalyÕs tendency, when 
elaborating upon responsibilist theories of virtue and vice, to state a commonly acknowledged feature of 
virtue and then invert it to get the corresponding feature of vice (2016b: 103-106). Now, even if a strong 
                                                      
21 One notable virtue theorist who clearly didnÕt take this position is Philippa Foot  (2002), who suggests that virtues 
are bulwarks against the natural human drift towards badness. A similar idea regarding intellectual virtues features 
in Roberts and Wood (2007: 82). 
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variant of the epistemic inversion thesis were true there would still be interesting vice epistemology to do, 
in the investigation of less orthodox and recognisable vices22 and drawing out the various different forms 
the opposite of a virtue can take23. However, my concern is that an unthinking adherence to the inversion 
thesis, and the concomitant assumption that virtue and vice are mirror images in all or most respects, has 
stymied discussion of vice and thus occluded the important disanalogies between the two.  
Of particular relevance to the discussion at hand, I suspect that the inversion thesis accounts for 
the widespread tendency to assume that intellectual vice necessarily involves some kind of inappropriate 
orientation towards epistemic goods, an assumption rarely explicated or explicitly defended. Virtue 
requires motivations towards the epistemic good, and since virtue and vice are opposites, so this line of 
reasoning goes, vice must involve the opposite. My purpose in this paper is not to reject the underlying 
idea that virtue and vice are opposites; as IÕve noted, this is trivially the case. Rather, my purpose is to 
problematise inferential leaps like the line of reasoning just given. Sure, virtue and vice are opposites in 
some respects, but maybe these respects are simply the very general and uninformative: virtues are good 
and vices bad, or virtues praiseworthy and vices blameworthy. Or perhaps they are more substantive after 
all; perhaps, for example, there is a more complex account of virtuous motivation that goes beyond a 
focus on oneÕs orientation towards epistemic goods, or an account where virtuous motivation is 
supplemented by some further non-motivational requirement, 24 that could be inverted to provide a 
plausible account of vice. I shall not attempt to settle this question here. What I have argued is that the 
kind of motivational approach often presumed by virtue epistemologists, in which vice requires an 
inappropriate orientation towards epistemic goods just as virtue requires an appropriate one, is 
implausible. This provides a cautionary tale concerning the inversion thesis: namely, that if an assumption 
of symmetry between virtue and vice serves as an impediment to focussed vice epistemology, then we risk 
                                                      
22  For example, testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007), epistemic self-indulgence (Battaly 2010), and epistemic 
malevolence (Baehr 2010). 
23 See Roberts and Wood (2007: 235) on the plethora of vices that correspond to humility.  
24 After all, a further implication of the Galileo and Dave cases is that the appropriate orientation towards epistemic 
goods cannot be straightforwardly sufficient for virtue. 
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missing out on the interesting and important ways that virtue and vice can come apart. Even if there are 
parallels between the two concepts, that is, we need to be careful where and how we draw them. We 
should not presume that every feature, or even every important feature, of one will find a straightforward 
corollary in the other. 
5: Conclusion 
I have argued that vice does not require a defective motivational state, either in the form of the presence 
of a motivation towards epistemic bads or the absence of motivation towards epistemic goods. Rather, 
the badness and blameworthiness of these character traits can be derived from other psychological and, 
perhaps, non-psychological features. I have not attempted to state in any detail what these may be, 
although I have given some indications along the way. With the motivational approach rejected and a 
note of caution issued about the inversion thesis, this is one of several areas where there is now important 
vice epistemology to be done. 
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